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Introduction
In October 2018, the Gilets Jaunes emerged as a leaderless grassroots movement
advocating for economic justice in France. The Gilets Jaunes led approximately 60 Actes,
marking well over a year of sustained collective action. The longevity of the Gilets
Jaunes is unprecedented in France; two previous French social movements, the May 1968
protests and the Nuit Debout movement, lasted only around seven weeks and three
months respectively. The Gilets Jaunes movement is also unique due to its deliberate
eschewing of institutional and third party support, including labor unions, political parties
and civil society organizations. Yet another distinguishing aspect of the movement is the
specificity of the protestors’ demands, which were published and disseminated online, in
contrast to the comparatively vague ideological consciousness of the movement itself.
Interestingly, the Gilets Jaunes have resisted political identification of any kind,
repeatedly resisting attempts by the Rassemblement National, France’s far right party, to
co-opt it.1
One puzzle presented by these particularities is the movement’s rise in spite of its
deliberate eschewing of institutional and third party support, given that social movements
have traditionally benefitted from institutionalization and coalition building. How did the
movement’s lack of such support interact with these other particularities to help or hinder
its success?
To answer these questions, this paper will first investigate the movement’s
emergence and then conduct a demographical analysis of the Gilets Jaunes protestors,
including socioeconomic status, political orientation, and reactions to mainstream

Ketcham, Christopher. “A Play with No End: What the Gilets Jaunes Really Want.” Harper’s Magazine.
December 12, 2019. https://harpers.org/archive/2019/08/a-play-with-no-end-gilets-jaunes/
1
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representative institutions. These factors will demonstrate the ways in which Gilets
Jaunes members straddle conventional partisan and social identities. This paper will then
examine the movement’s unprecedented durability through an investigation of the Gilets
Jaunes’ characterization as “anti-system.” The goal is to understand the reasons for the
Gilets Jaunes’ low coalition building potential with political parties and unions and how
these factors can help explain the movement’s durability in the context of the Gilets
Jaunes’ rejection of institutional support. Finally, this paper will reflect on the
movement’s successes and limitations to theorize what changes in partisan identification
foreshadow for French democracy.

Emergence of the Gilets Jaunes
The first traces of the Gilets Jaunes movement originated online in response to a
series of policies instituted by President Emmanuel Macron during the first months of his
presidency. These included a special tax on diesel and a reduction of the speed limit to 80
kilometers per hour, both intended to lower France’s carbon footprint.2 However, these
measures would disproportionately affect working class people living in rural
communities, who had no other option but to drive to work. Not only did wealthier
people predominantly living in cities not face similar taxes on their lifestyles, but also,
adding insult to injury, Macron had canceled an Impot sur la Fortune, or wealth tax, six
months before announcing the diesel tax. It was therefore widely speculated that the fuel
taxes, introduced under the guise of environmental concern, was in fact intended to

2

“Macron Recommits to Fuel Tax Amid Rising Protests.” The Wall Street Journal. November 27, 2018.
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shrink the deficit produced by Macron’s removal of the wealth tax.3 This leads us to
expect significant implications for how protestors might frame the gas tax as a class
issue, an assumption that proves correct.
A multitude of petitions were created and circulated in the months after this series
of legislative decisions. One prominent effort was that of Priscillia Ludosky, a selfemployed cosmetics businesswoman from Parisian suburb Seine-en-Marne, who in May
2018 posted a petition on the change.org website entitled “Pour une Baisse des Prix du
Carburant à la Pompe!” or “For a drop in the fuel prices at the pump!”4 The petition
gained little traction; by October, it had only accumulated around 1,000 signatures. In
October, Éric Drouet, a French truck driver from the same Parisian suburb, contacted
Ludosky to help promote the petition. Around the same time, a local newspaper covered
Ludosky’s appearance on a radio show; as a result, the article about her petition was
shared to a Seine-et-Marne Facebook page with around 50,000 subscribers. Importantly,
petrol prices had been continuously rising due to a global spike in oil prices. Following
this combination of factors Ludosky’s petition went viral, accumulating over 200,000
signatures. By early December, it had collected over 1.2 million.5
In an effort distinct from Ludosky’s and other online petitions that had been
gaining momentum, Drouet and another truck driver, also from Seine-en-Marne, created

Kim Willsher. “Macron Scraps Fuel Tax Rise in Face of Gilets Jaunes Protests.” The Guardian. December
5, 2018.
4
“Priscillia Ludosky, L’auteure de la Pétition sur les Prix du Carburant Répond à Emmanuel Macron.”
Europe1. December 26, 2018.
5
Rubin, Alissa J. “France’s Yellow Vest Protests: The Movement That Has Put Paris on Edge.” The New
York Times. December 3, 2018.
3
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a Facebook event called “National Blockage Against Rising Fuel,” scheduled for
November 17.6
Beginning with the first demonstration on November 17, the Gilets Jaunes’ two
main forms of protest include the occupation of public spaces, especially on heavily
trafficked roundabouts, and weekly marches, or ‘Acts,’ held on weekends, usually
Saturdays, throughout France.7 The protests quickly transcended the original fuel tax
focus, exploding into a movement against widening inequality, stagnant economic
growth, and a fundamental sense of social crisis, all of which have been felt by
vulnerable, predominantly rural communities, for whom the fuel tax was the final straw.8
A February 2019 survey showed that protestors said they were demonstrating to
oppose the political elites (50%); to share the country’s wealth (44%); to fight against
unjust fiscal measures (44%); to move away from the policies in place over decades
(34%); to improve the way democracy works (25%); and to demand dignity and
recognition (19%)9. The protestors had strong support from the public, with opinion polls
indicating support at over 70% in early December 2018 and over 50% by late March
2019.10
In short, what began as a fuel protest evolved into a broader, all-encompassing
anti-government movement. This phenomenon is unsurprising, according to scholars
such as professor of history at New York University Herrick Chapman, who posits that
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, established by Charles de Gaulle in 1958,
Moullot, Pauline. “Hausse du Prix de l’essence: Qui est à l’origine.du Mouvement du 17 Novembre?”
Libération. October 26, 2018.
7
Frédéric Royall, “The Gilets Jaunes Protests: Mobilisation Without Third-Party Support,” Modern &
Contemporary France, DOI: 10.1080/09639489.2019.1676217
8
Christopher Caldwell. “The People’s Emergency.” The New Republic. April 22, 2019.
9
Royall, “Mobilisation Without Third-Party Support.”
10
Bernard Sananes, Laurence Bedeau, Thomas Vitiello. “Les ‘Gilets Jaunes’: La Partie Emergée de la
Crise Sociale Française?” Institut Montaigne. 2019.
6
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centralized power in the Presidential palace to such an extreme extent – even designing
the National Assembly to operate as subordinate – that it kickstarted a cyclical effect by
which extra institutional action, such as street protests and social movements, became the
only alternative to policy.11 The Fifth Republic’s overcentralized authority has been
funneling French citizens into the streets, as seen through the protests of May 1968, Nuit
Debout, and now the Gilets Jaunes, since its inception. While the emergence of the Gilets
Jaunes aligns with theories of French political cycles, the movement’s durability and
eschewal of third party support are unprecedented and therefore require further analysis
to understand current cycles of French political change.

Who are the Gilets Jaunes: Economic, Political and Social Characteristics of Gilet Jaune
Participants
Due to the decentralized and evolving nature of social movements, data pertaining
to the demographics of the Gilets Jaunes movement are not exact. However, a group of
sociologists, political scientists and geographers published a study of the motivations and
socio-demographic profiles of the movement based on an analysis of 166 questionnaires
distributed to participants at roundabouts and vehicle tollbooths as well as during the
demonstrations of November 24 and December 1.12 These data reveal a variety of
economic, political and cultural factors that mobilized a population in favor of a degree
of political change that they no longer trust the political system and elite to achieve for
them.

11

Adam Gopnik. “The Yellow Vests and Why There Are So Many Street Protests in France.” The New
Yorker, 6 Dec. 2018.
12
“Gilets Jaunes: A Pioneering Study of the ‘Low Earners’ Revolt.” Verso Books. December 14, 2018.
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Age
The researchers found that the average protestor was 45 years old, slightly older
than the average age of the French population (41.4 years). 27% of participants were 3549 years old and 26% were 50-64 years old. By comparison, 6% were 18-24, while
17.3% was over 65.
These data are unsurprising because this age category has, on average, been
edging closer to poverty, experiencing an economic position of insecurity, or “la précarité
économique.” Furthermore, they make up an influential voting bloc: France’s 15 million
pensioners vote at a higher rate than other age groups.13 However, while three out of four
pensioners voted for Macron in the second round of the 2017 presidential election, a
March 2018 survey conducted by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique indicated that
pensioners’ support for Macron had fallen to 53%.14 This is significant, indicating a
partisan identification shift. This shift demands a response from political parties if they
want to retain their most vital source of power – popular support.
During his campaign, Macron had pledged to increase the general social
contribution (CSG) tax, whose revenues are allocated to the social security budget,
including pension schemes and insurance. However, many pensioners claimed they had
actually been hurt by Macron’s other tax measures, such as the diesel tax and social
welfare reductions. The government had estimated that, as a result of the tax changes, 20-

Ingrid Melander, “French Pensioners Tell Macron to Stop Squeezing Their Finances,” Reuters, March
15, 2018.
14
Melander, “French Pensioners,” 2018.
13

9

25% of pensioners would experience a deficit of a few dozen euros, while the wealthiest
pensioners could see their spending power fall by several hundred euros per year.15
Labor force participation at older ages in France has been found to have a strong
relationship with reforms of retirement and preretirement policy.16 This is supported by
the case of the Gilets Jaunes, in which widespread mobilization of pensioners follows a
fifteen-year reversal of older workers’ labor force participation and employment rates.17
While changes in health, life expectancy and education levels have remained more or less
consistent, pension reforms and associated changes in monetary incentives have been
identified as the factors prompting individuals to work longer with increasingly
precarious economic stability. This demographic is relatively unusual for the usual
French contentious politics.
This older demographic as core part of the Gilets Jaunes movement contrasts with
past movements, including Nuit Debout and May 1968, both initiated by students.
Arguably, the Gilets Jaunes movement represents a later phase of Nuit Debout: the
abstract disillusionment of the younger, urban Nuit Debout protestors was concretized
into a wide-ranging list of specific demands by the Gilets Jaunes.

Socioeconomic Class
The unusual age demographic of the Gilets Jaunes links tightly with the
socioeconomic class demographics of the movement because the makeup of the Gilets

Melander, “French Pensioners,” 2018.
Didier Blanchet, Louis-Paul Pele. “Social Security and Retirement in France,” University of Chicago
Press (April 1999).
17
Didier Blanchet, Antoine Bozio, Simon Rabaté, Muriel Roger. “Workers’ Employment Rates and
Pension Reforms in France: The Role of Implicit Labor Taxation,” The National Bureau of Economic
Research, no. 25733 (April 2019).
15
16
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Jaunes shows that what is new about the Gilets Jaunes is its linkage to the qualms of
rural, older French citizens, unlike past movements, which typically represented a
mobilization of the young, urban French.
The average Gilet Jaune is a member of the working or lower middle class. The
study found a high presence of employees and poor representation of middle-level
professionals and managers. Employees made up 33% of the participants (45% of those
of working age), compared to 27% for France as a whole, while middle-level
professionals made up 10% of participants (13% of those of working age), compared to
26% for France as a whole. Managers comprised around 5% of participants (7% of those
of working age), compared to 18% of France as a whole.18
55% of respondents said they paid income tax (a percentage comparable to that of
the general population) and 85% said they owned a car. Researchers reported that the
median declared household income was 1,700 euros per month, around 30% less than the
median for all French households.19 If this sample can be assumed to be representative of
the broader Gilets Jaunes population, this indicates that the majority of participants are in
a precarious financial situation, but not the most economically vulnerable: 10% of
respondents declared an income below 800 euros per month, higher than 519 euros per
month for the corresponding poorest 10% of French households.20
One limitation of this study is that it did not examine unemployment as a distinct
criterion. However, a comparison of unemployment rates between urban and rural areas
in France as a whole presents a puzzle for my research question because we would expect
that the regions with higher unemployment would be driving the movement focused on
“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
20
“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
18
19
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economic justice. However, not only is the unemployment rate in France actually higher
in urban areas (10% in urban areas compared to 6% in rural areas in 2017)21 but both
rates have been decreasing since their record high in 2015 (11% and 6% respectively).22
Paradoxically, those from rural areas have mobilized to a far greater extent than those
living in urban areas.
This can be explained by several economic and social factors. First of all, rural
areas have been struggling for decades due to globalization, which has caused
disproportionate levels of delocalization, out-migration and unemployment in rural
regions. The devastating effects of globalization were accelerated by the 2008 financial
crisis, from which these populations were unable to recover. Between 2010 and 2013
alone, French companies relocating abroad cost the country 20,000 jobs.23 Furthermore,
202,000 full-time equivalent jobs had already been lost in the auto sector during the years
2004-2007, which then experienced a fall of 8% in 2008. Since then, French automakers
have begun producing the majority of their cars outside of France, reserving few, top of
the line vehicles for French plants.24 In that same time period, industrial jobs in France as
a whole fell from 5.5 million to 3.5 million, with the most heavily affected sectors being
real estate and construction. Thus, while unemployment rates may have been higher in
urban areas, those areas were also more economically resilient, being better positioned to
attract budding industries. In rural areas, by contrast, a closed factory left a huge wave of
unemployment in its wake, leaving workers in neighboring towns no choice but to seek
temporary labor, to make do with government aid, or to move. Demographer Hervé Le
“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
23
“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
24
Carlos Maravall-Rodriguez and Anna Chiara Küffel. “A Comparative View of Motor Vehicle Production
in France.” European Commission. December 2018.
21
22

12

Bras observed that the map of Gilets Jaunes mobilization matches the map of French
regions that are losing population.25
This phenomenon appears to be in line with relative deprivation theories, which
posit that people who feel unfairly deprived of resources will join social movements in
order to acquire the resources that other members possess.26 The Gilets Jaunes’
socioeconomic grievances have contributed to the movement’s durability through the
sense of solidarity protestors found within the movement once they joined. Members of a
lower socioeconomic status often find it more difficult to find socializing opportunities,
between having to work longer hours and not having the extra money necessary to
finance a night out. I will argue below that this is a reason for durability.
A vast array of interviews published in news publications and independent
documentaries reveal that many protestors saw social rewards in joining the movement.
The documentary “J’veux du Soleil!” featured commentary by numerous protestors who
shared their experiences of not being able to afford going out: “However little it would
cost us, we wouldn’t be able to afford it,” said one of the protestors interviewed at a rondpoint. “We didn’t exist and suddenly we found each other. There’s fraternity. The friends
I have now I hadn’t had like that in ten years,” said another protestor. Other comments
included, “We’ve formed such strong social bonds. I’ve cried more than once” and
“We’re doing something crazy, together. It’s wonderful… we’re one big family here.”
One protestor commented, “People are very scared of their neighbors. There’s no
solidarity. That’s something to restore.” This analysis of a transition from isolation to
solidarity is in clear alignment with breakdown theory, which posits that actors who are
25

“Hervé Le Bras a Dessiné La Carte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Youtube, 7 Dec. 2018.
Korpi, Walter. "Conflict, Power and Relative Deprivation." The American Political Science Review 68,
no. 4 (1974): 1569-578. doi:10.2307/1959942.
26

13

weakly integrated into their community and experience social discontent are more likely
to join a protest movement.27 According to breakdown theorist Anthony Oberschall
(1978), “Breakdown theory points to the dissolution of traditional social formations and
communal solidarities as a result of rapid social change. Social disorganization,
demographic pressures, and ecological imbalance lead to the accumulation of strains,
frustrations, insecurity, and grievances, and the resulting pressure cooker has a tendency
to explode in collective violence and civil disorder.”28
The Gilets Jaunes movement, rather than supplementing other socializing
opportunities, offered a sense of community and social connection of which many of the
protestors had felt otherwise deprived. These social rewards have helped to sustain
collective action within the movement.
The case of the Gilets Jaunes presents a challenge to solidarity theorists, who, in
opposition to breakdown theorists, argue that isolated individuals are less likely to protest
than others because protest is reliant on social cohesion. They argue that solidarity is
necessary to produce bloc mobilization, by which movements can expand by enlisting
entire blocs of organized people instead of recruiting individuals one by one. The case of
Gilets Jaunes, however, shows that social breakdown and discontent can motivate people
to create solidarity and mobilizing structures even without preexisting social cohesion, as
displayed by the success of rond-point demonstrations.
Overall, the sense of community found within the movement greatly aided its
momentum, particularly because many of those who joined had felt previously isolated,
as interviews have revealed. I theorize that this social isolation, combined with a sense of
27

Useem, Bert. "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement." American
Sociological Review 45, no. 3 (1980): 357-69.
28
Useem. "Solidarity Model." American Sociological Review 45, no. 3 (1980): 357-69.
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economic suffering and political invisibility, heightened the sense solidarity found within
the movement. It can be surmised that this is a broader phenomenon for the Gilets Jaunes
because of the prevalence of these social and economic conditions among participants.
These factors’ impact was compounded by the movement’s lack of third
party/institutional support, which contributed to an additional bond of shared alienation.

Educational Qualifications
Researchers found that 20% of respondents had a university-level degree (versus
27% of the general French population), 35% of participants had obtained vocational high
school degrees (versus 24% in the general population) and 29% had obtained general
baccalaureate degrees (compared with 16% of the general population).29 Additional
findings from the December 8 demonstration, which saw more additional respondents
with master’s degrees, led the researchers to conclude that the population of participants
had comparable educational qualifications to the general French population.
These findings underscore the fact that the Gilets Jaunes represent a mobilization
not of those at the very bottom, but of those who have found themselves inching closer to
the brink of poverty. In addition, it is likely that more of the people who are unemployed
in rural areas are older than those who are unemployed in urban areas, due to rising
trends of delocalization and globalization, which have driven the bulk of employment
opportunities to urban areas. This represents further confirmation of relative deprivation:
people who feel unfairly deprived of resources are joining the Gilets Jaunes to acquire the
resources that others possess.

29

“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
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Motivations for Joining
In response to the question “Why are you demonstrating today?” more than half
of the respondents cited “inadequate purchasing power,” such as not being able to afford
small luxuries, struggling to feed their children and moving in with family or friends due
to housing being no longer affordable. The second most popular response, from over 40%
of respondents, was “excessive tax burden.” Many specifically listed high fuel prices.
Approximately 20% said they were demonstrating to protest against the government and
to demand Macron’s resignation. 10% of respondents wanted institutional reforms, a
sentiment that had strengthened among participants in the December 8 demonstrations.30

Objectives of the Gilets Jaunes: Les Revendications Officielles
As part of the survey, the researchers asked participants what the government
should do to address the Gilets Jaunes’ demands. Given that the majority of respondents
focused on economic goals rather than institutional reforms, one might surmise that they
could be willing to work with parties if they felt that were the only way to make progress.
This indicates the importance of the parties’ response to the Gilets Jaunes’ platform and
is supported by the evidence below.
One third of respondents said implement tax cuts and another third said institute
measures to increase purchasing power. Among these, 16% wanted an increase in the
minimum wage or wages in general, 8% wanted a general increase in purchasing power
and 4% wanted an increase in pensions. Over a fifth of respondents wanted wealth
redistribution. Among these, 11% wanted the reinstatement of the wealth tax and 3%

30

“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.

16

wanted a fairer distribution of taxes.31 Over a fifth of respondents wanted the government
to show more compassion and understanding toward citizens. In regards to institutional
demands, 16% said significant institutional reforms were vital in order to deem the
movement a success: 11% demanded fundamental changes, including a total reform of
the state or a different political system, 5% wanted to end “the privileges of
parliamentarians” and 2% said they believed in the necessity of a Sixth Republic.32
Unlike past French movements such as Nuit Debout, which concerned abstract
political and philosophical questions, the Gilets Jaunes presented concrete, bread-andbutter demands. The “Charte Officielle des Gilets Jaunes,” or Official Chart of the Gilets
Jaunes, was first posted to a Facebook group of the same name on December 5, 2018,
where it was widely circulated.33 The chart, followed by the list of demands translated
into English, are included on the next page.

“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
“Gilets Jaunes,” Verso Books. 2018.
33
“Charte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Facebook, www.facebook.com/Charte-des-gilets-jaunes-756772671347085/.
31
32
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Gilets Jaunes' List of Demands34
Economy/Work
•
•
•
•
•
•

A constitutional cap on taxes - at 25%
Increase of 40% in the basic pension and social welfare
Increase hiring in public sector to re-establish public services
Massive construction projects to house 5 million homeless, and severe penalties
for mayors/prefectures that leave people on the streets
Break up the 'too-big-to-fail' banks, re-separate regular banking from investment
banking
Cancel debts accrued through usurious rates of interest

Politics
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•

Constitutional amendments to protect the people's interests, including binding
referenda
The barring of lobby groups and vested interests from political decision-making
Frexit: Leave the EU to regain our economic, monetary and political sovereignty
(In other words, respect the 2005 referendum result, when France voted against
the EU Constitution Treaty, which was then renamed the Lisbon Treaty)
Clampdown on tax evasion by the ultra-rich
The immediate cessation of privatization, and the re-nationalization of public
goods like motorways, airports, rail, etc.
Remove all ideology from the ministry of education, ending all destructive
education techniques
Quadruple the budget for law and order and put time limits on judicial procedures.
Make access to the justice system available for all
Break up media monopolies and end their interference in politics. Make media
accessible to citizens and guarantee a plurality of opinions. End editorial
propaganda
Guarantee citizens' liberty by including in the constitution a complete prohibition
on state interference in their decisions concerning education, health and family
matters

Health/Environment
•

•
•
•
•
34

No more 'planned obsolescence' - Mandate guarantee from producers that their
products will last 10 years, and that spare parts will be available during that
period
Ban plastic bottles and other polluting packaging
Weaken the influence of big pharma on health in general and hospitals in
particular
Ban on GMO crops, carcinogenic pesticides, endocrine disruptors and monocrops
Reindustrialize France (thereby reducing imports and thus pollution)

“Charte Des Gilets Jaunes.” Facebook, www.facebook.com/Charte-des-gilets-jaunes-756772671347085/.
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Foreign Affairs
•
•

•
•

End France's participation in foreign wars of aggression, and exit from NATO
Cease pillaging and interfering - politically and militarily - in 'Francafrique',
which keeps Africa poor. Immediately repatriate all French soldiers. Establish
relations with African states on an equal peer-to-peer basis
Prevent migratory flows that cannot be accommodated or integrated, given the
profound civilizational crisis we are experiencing
Scrupulously respect international law and the treaties we have signed

A Dual Analysis of the Gilets Jaunes as an Anti-System Movement
Theoretical definitions of “anti-system” political groups shed light on the durability
of the Gilets Jaunes despite their consistent resistance to institutionalization. According to
Florentine political analyst Giovanni Sartori, “An anti-system opposition abides by a
belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it operates.
According to the strict definition, then, anti-system parties represent an extraneous
ideology – thereby indicating a polity confronted with a maximal ideological difference
(Sartori, 1976). Capoccia elaborates on this analysis, arguing that “Sartori’s concept of
the anti-system party is thus ‘relational’ in a twofold sense: first, it involves the
ideological distance of a party from the others along the political (left-right) space of
electoral competition; second, it refers to the delegitimizing impact of the party’s actions
and propaganda on the regime in which it operates.”35

Capoccia, Giovanni. “Anti-System Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment.” Journal of Theoretical Politics
14, no. 1 (2002): 9-13.
35
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The Gilets Jaunes embody multiple elements of anti-politics party represented in
the table above: (a) their demands illustrate their spatial distance from the mainstream
political spectrum because their demands align with an array of party ideologies across
the political spectrum, revealing a main reason why the Gilets Jaunes feel unrepresented:
there is no established political party that represents all of their interests (b) there has
been low potential for coalition building with political parties and labor unions, and (c)
the government and media responses to the movement have sought to delegitimize it
through accusations of anti-Semitism and homophobia.37 The next sections will expand
on points (a) and (b) to understand how aspects of these anti-system characteristics can be
used to understand the movement’s durability and future.

Capoccia, “Anti-System Parties.” 2002.
Lucy Williamson. “Gilets Jaunes: How Much Anti-Semitism is Beneath the Yellow Vests?” BBC News.
February 19, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-47286576
36
37
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Distant Spatial Location: the Gilets Jaunes’ Nonpartisan Demands and Challenge to
Political Parties
The Gilets Jaunes’ wide-ranging demands are key to understanding the
movement’s resistance to institutional and third party support. These demands, as
aforementioned, align with an array of party ideologies across the political spectrum and
therefore reveal a main reason why the Gilets Jaunes feel unrepresented: there is no
established political party that represents all of their interests. For example, left parties
such as La France Insoumise espouse pension and minimum wage increases, while the
demand to crack down on migratory flows is aligned with parties of the right, such as the
Rassemblement National. No mainstream political party in France, meanwhile, calls for
demands such as amending the constitution. The Gilets Jaunes’ demands to amend the
constitution, consistent with protestors in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, may seem at odds with
the institutional distrust that defines their movement. However, amending the constitution
would represent reclamation of the state by those who feel powerless; many protestors
envision a constitution of the people that would restore their trust in government because
they would have greater agency to shape it. Aside from institutional distrust, the spatial
distance between Gilets Jaunes interests and current party platforms is sufficient to
explain their extra institutional action. With over five main political parties in France, not
one political platform aligns with the majority of the Gilets Jaunes’ political and
economic demands. This reflects the growing political phenomenon that political parties
have gradually abandoned the working class.
The increasing misalignment between mainstream party platforms and the
interests of the working class has been acknowledged as a growing trend in Western
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democracies. Patrick Liddiard, a political analyst at the Wilson Center, posits that
structural economic changes in advanced industrial democracies have decreased voters’
demand for traditional political parties of the traditional center-left and center-right
orientations, while deindustrialization has reduced the working class, giving the political
left less of an incentive to cater to this demographic.38 Further, political scientists Russel
Dalton and Michael Wattenberg argue that deindustrialization, which has produced a
more educated population, means these increasingly informed electorates are less
dependent on information from traditional political parties to form their individual
political opinions. Consequentially, voters become less attached to party labels and elites
and increasingly engaged in alternative forms of political mobilization.39
In France, there is ample evidence of weakened partisan attachment. According to
researchers Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, “flash” political parties indicate
weak political involvement and partisan commitments: “such phenomena are hardly
signals of long-term public involvement in politics but betray instead a normal weak
involvement. The durably involved voter tends toward strong partisan commitments and
his behavior over time stabilizes party fortunes within a nation.”40 Macron’s “La
Republique En Marche” is one such example of a flash political party whose short-lived
success, contrary to Macron’s language of strengthened unity, reveals the current culture
of French citizens’ weak partisan commitments.
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The chart above41 illustrates the correlation between voter turnout and party
system volatility as indicated by changes in existing parties’ vote shares, parties’ vote
share between elections, and new/defunct parties’ vote shares. As turnout has decreased,
partisan attachment has also decreased, indicating a loss of legitimacy in mainstream
political parties.
Focusing back on the ideological and political spatial distance between the Gilets
Jaunes and mainstream political parties, this phenomenon is particularly visible in a
popular Gilet Jaune Facebook group called “Gilet Jaune,” which contains 25,480
members at the time of writing. The chart below offers further insight into the issues that
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active members care about by comparing the number of mentions per topic (loosely
corresponding to the aforementioned list of official demands) in December of 2018
versus December 2019.

Number of Mentions per Topic in "Gilet Jaune" Facebook Group
December 2018 (blue) vs. December 2019 (red)
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Issues like “travail,” “constitution,” “liberté,” “media,” and “pollution” all
appeared around 40-50 times in 2018. This chart illustrates the Gilets Jaunes’ ideological
and political spatial distance from mainstream political parties because stances of this
high frequency fall across the political spectrum, underscoring that no party represents
their demands.
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Their demands lie outside of traditional left-right spectrum, a spectrum that they
challenge through their emphasis on nonpartisan rhetoric and identification, as well as
their voting rates. This is demonstrated by the fact that Gilets Jaunes emphatically
identify as unattached to the language of left-right party politics. Even when organizing
for political office, they described their roster of candidates as “nonpartisan and
independent,” a) dissociating from the political party structure and b) casting themselves
as a challenge to it.42 While there is not currently sufficient data of party membership
among the Gilets Jaunes, a poll showed that in the 2017 presidential election many in the
movement voted for candidates on the far left or the far right; however, many also did not
vote at all.43
Furthermore, in the aforementioned analysis of 166 questionnaires distributed to
Gilets Jaunes protestors, 33% of respondents identified as apolitical, or “neither right nor
left” (versus 22% of France as a whole).44 Among those who did identify their position,
15% placed themselves on the far left, 42% were on the left, 12% were on the right and
5% were on the far right (compared to 32% on the left and 39% on the right in France as
a whole). Only 6% of respondents ranked themselves in the political center. One
takeaway is that based on their wide range of political identification it is clear that
political orientation and party affiliation represent weaker ties for this group than their
specific, collective demands. Another takeaway is that, interestingly, despite the wide
range of partisan identification, this data suggests that Gilets Jaunes participants are more
likely to be on the Left. According to analyst Laurent Bouvet, a member of the leftwing
42
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thinktank the Jean Jaurès Foundation, which advises the Socialist party, there is ample
evidence that the French working class has been abandoned by the left through the focus
on problems of minority groups instead of French society more broadly, which
exacerbates working-class concerns about immigration and resulting cultural changes. In
an interview with The Observer, Bouvet said “the economic crisis, unemployment, social
problems, globalization make people afraid, but if it was just about economics we would
see these people vote for the radical left, which they are not.”45
In conclusion, the Gilets Jaunes’ ideological and political spatial distance from
mainstream political parties can be explained by a perceived abandonment by the left and
the misalignment between their demands and the platforms of mainstream political
parties. While protestors mostly identify with the left, they do not trust existing
institutions.
In other words, the specificity of the protestors’ political and economic demands
shows that they are unified in their sense of invisibility and economic exclusion.
However, the fact that they are comparatively divided in political orientation explains the
ideological vagueness of the movement and indicates the challenge that the Gilets Jaunes’
mobilization poses to the political party system. There is ample research leading scholars
to argue that the population no longer maps clearly onto dominant party positions.
According to Gérard Grunberg, a researcher at the Center for European Studies at
Sciences Po, the political cleavages separating mainstream parties, such as the economy,
are no longer the issues that drive popular political debate. “On immigration, Europe,
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globalization, the big divide now is whether you want an open or closed country.”46
Pierre Rosanvallon, a professor at the Collège de France, makes the argument that
“Voters have moved from a representation system to an identification system. In the old
system, parties had identifiable social bases and their job was to represent that base, to
aggregate their interests … Now we are in a process of identification … The new leaders
are presenting themselves like concepts and voters are asked to adhere to that.”47 This
line of reasoning applies to both Macron’s party and the National Front, which are based
on the personality of Macron and Marine Le Pen rather than appealing to specific voter
bases. Political scientist Pierre Cayrol argues that the obsolescence of the French twoparty system does not automatically affect the concept of the left-right spectrum; the
difference, instead, will be that the differences are based on sentimental identification
rather than policy differences. Social issues will be left as the sole distinction between the
left and the right.48 The Gilets Jaunes exemplify this separation of policy demands from
political orientation: they represent an apartisan embrace of an expanded social safety
net, instruments of direct democracy and class solidarity.
Furthermore, in this context of rising political distrust, underscored by rising levels of
abstention and of the tendency to vote “against” rather than “for” a candidate (Macron’s
2017 victory was due to his outsider status and rejection of his far-right opponent, rather
than an embrace of his free market and pro-European platform)49, a system in which
people can act as their own representatives such as direct democracy becomes more
appealing.
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The Low Coalition Building Potential of the Gilets Jaunes
Another reason for the movement’s resistance to institutionalization is that many
protestors were already distrustful of mainstream institutions: Gilets Jaunes participants
largely eschew institutional and third party support, with the majority holding that trade
unions (64%) and political parties (81%) had no place in the movement.
The Gilets Jaunes’ distrust of mainstream institutions, their diversity of political
orientation and the misalignment between their demands and the platforms of mainstream
political parties offer a compelling explanation of characterizations of the Gilets Jaunes
as “anti-system.” However, while the protestors’ distrust, diversity of political orientation
and the misalignment between their demands and the platforms of mainstream political
parties explain the low coalition building potential between the Gilets Jaunes and political
parties, these factors but do not account for coalition building potential with labor unions,
of which the Gilets Jaunes have also been dismissive.
Articles indicate that French unions have adopted varied and evolving stances
toward the Gilets Jaunes movement. On December 6, 2018, a few weeks after the initial
demonstration, leaders of the union confederations came together to decide on an official
position regarding the uprisings. The CFDT, CGT, FO, CFE-CGC, Unsa and the FSU
released a collective declaration calling for the government to “finally commit to genuine
negotiations” regarding “spending power, salaries, transport, housing, the presence and
accessibility of public services, and the tax system,”50 affirming Gilets Jaunes demands.
However, as part of this declaration, the union confederations denounced all forms of
violence in by protestors expressing these demands.
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Several unions have shown tentative signs of support for the Gilets Jaunes in
acknowledgement of their many shared positions, which include a reinstating of the
wealth tax and canceling the increase to retirees’ taxes. The CGT marched during the
Acte III demonstration in Paris alongside trade unionists, though separate from the Gilets
Jaunes.51 Attac, a union that advocates for reforms to the financial system and greater
regulation of markets, were distributing pamphlets at Acte III. “I didn’t hear of them
being thrown aside,” said Annick Coupé, secretary general of Attac.52
Several factors help to explain the Gilets Jaunes’ resistance to unions despite
occupying shared positions. First of all, unions have experienced a gradual loss of power
in recent years; interestingly, the emergence of alternative forms of political mobilization
in France has correlated with this gradual decline of unions. In his first 10 months in
office, Macron softened France’s strict labor laws in an act of hostility toward unions.53
However, signs of weakening French unions have existed for decades: union membership
has fallen dramatically since 1968.54 Consequently, strikes have become less effective
and therefore less frequent. As a result, over time, political parties and labor unions have
gradually lost the monopoly they once enjoyed over the French political infrastructure.
Therefore, despite an overlap in policy goals, the Gilets Jaunes do not see unions as a
reliable route through which they could mobilize effectively. This indicates that the
reason that the Gilets Jaunes do not work with unions is less an issue of distrust and more
logistical concerns that they see unions as inefficient and less influential than before. “We
might remember that classic union movements have not been able, over the last few
51
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years, to make any social advances. One consequence that is that anger that was muted,
it’s being heard today,” said confederal secretary of the CGT Fabrice Angéï.55 Éric
Beynel, spokesperson for Solidaires, echoed this sentiment: “The unions haven’t
successfully built the necessary mobilisations to struggle against social injustices. On the
labour law, we would have had to blockade the economy through strikes, but we didn’t
manage to do it.”
The demographics of the Gilets Jaunes reveal another reason for a disconnect
between unions and Gilets Jaunes protestors: the huge majority of Gilets Jaunes are
either inactifs (unemployed or retired; 25.5%), employés (service sector workers; 33.3%),
ouvriers (industrial workers; 14.4%), or in professions intermédiaires (nurses, primaryschool teachers; 5.2%); in other words, this movement is largely comprised of a
population that lives off wages and social security instead of profits or rent.
The unions have therefore been challenged by how to work with a population that
they do not represent. “Amongst the gilets jaunes, there are so many retirees, so many
precarious people, unemployed people. Our terrain is, before anywhere else, the world of
work. It’s a question which we’re posed with, the unions, how to reach out to these
categories too,” said Angéï.56 This is an important aspect of why Gilets Jaunes and unions
do not cooperate: unions look out for their own workers and the Gilets Jaunes are not
likely to be employed in union jobs, or even at all.
On the part of the Gilets Jaunes, there are logistical reasons that working with
unions can be difficult. In an interview, Serge, a Gilet Jaune and former customer service
employee, gave one explanation: “It gets stuck at the level of the demonstrations. When
55
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the unions demonstrate, they respect the route defined with the prefecture, while the
yellow vests think that if the police say something, the opposite must be done.”
Another Gilet Jaune, whose name was changed for security, said: “I went to ask
[the union] for information about my work, I really do not earn enough to get by. I
wanted to know if there was an enforceable law to make a living from work. And since
they had no answer, I joined the yellow vests. There, I realized that it was the same for
everyone; workers are poor, people who do not work are poor; even those who work
overtime can't do it, they are taxed so much. So I joined this movement really out of
conviction and I will continue to the end, despite the repression.”57
Another Gilet Jaune gave their perspective on the movement’s relationship with
unions: “We are in contact with the CGT, and with Lutte Ouvrière. We went to parade
with them. At the outset, they did not want us to speak. And then there lately, they let us
speak with them. Some unions didn't like it, but too bad! We do not know the laws well
and they can help us! We build, we build! … We don't want to be a union or a political
party. We really want to stay in a movement, to achieve a new way of ruling the
country.”
These interviews reveal the logistical and ideological differences between unions
and Gilets Jaunes that have made it difficult for the two groups to cooperate, while the
unions’ loss of power indicate lessened incentive for the Gilets Jaunes to work with
unions in the first place.
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Strengths, Limitations and Implications of the Gilets Jaunes
Having examined the demographics of the movement coupled with an
examination of its anti-system positionality, one broader question remains: what are the
implications of the Gilets Jaunes movement for French democracy?
In the face of institutional mistreatment, there are two options: scapegoating other
populations and holding the system accountable. While disillusioned Americans turned to
Donald Trump to resolve their existential woes, the Gilets Jaunes steadfastly chose the
route of political and economic system accountability and reform. Their early success
was impressive: two months after the demonstrations began, Macron succumbed to
public pressure and cancelled the fuel tax that had been the final straw for so many
protestors. A few months later, he embarked on the “grand débat,” a nationwide tour
consisting of a series of town halls to enable direct communication between Macron and
the French people. Macron’s concessions and nationwide tour reflect the Gaullist-design
of high power concentration in the presidency and the fact that he is less accountable to
parliament, allowing him to make policy changes, such as raising the minimum wage, on
the spot.
The Gilets Jaunes’ successes were owed to, not in spite of, their anti-system
positions, which united people from across the political spectrum. Additional factors
were their repertoires of contention, including the potent combination of local junction
blocking and weekly urban demonstrations, which offered accessibility for different
populations, heightened a sense of solidarity and social rewards, maximized the
movement’s visibility, and contributed to its durability.
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The Gilets Jaunes, initially empowered by the political diversity of their
protestors, ultimately found their ideological vagueness and resistance to
institutionalization to be a significant limitation. The movement’s ongoing refusal to form
coalitions with unions or to cooperate with political parties, even as some members have
begun to run for local office, condemned the Gilets Jaunes to political irrelevance on a
national scale. Though highly political, they have run out of avenues through which to
achieve their objectives because they have condemned them all.
Despite a gradual weakening on the national political scale, accelerated by the
outbreak of COVID-19, it is important to remember that they did succeed in resolving the
“final straws” that sparked demonstrations in the first place: the carbon tax was
suspended and government aid for working class was increased. However, in terms of
meeting their demands and resolving overarching themes of economic and social
inequality, the movement was overall ineffective. This is a typical outcome for policydriven, pressure group-type movements: they have issues, not broader institutional goals.
Once they achieve their policy demands, they demobilize58.
This realization seems to have dawned upon current Gilets Jaunes protestors,
whose institutional resistance has softened in recent months. The December 5, 2019
protest was reminiscent of a traditional French grève: it was peaceful, diverse and
featured the heavy presence of labor unions, whose organized security apparatus
prevented casseurs or violent demonstrators from joining. This mobilization represented a
stark departure from earlier acts, showing the extent to which the movement has evolved.
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In the face of dwindling numbers and the difficulties that come from a lack of
centralized leadership, Gilet Jaune activism has shifted from the occupation of public
space to local acts of daily resistance and civic engagement. Upon interviewing Gilets
Jaunes participants one year after the outbreak of the movement, one reporter observed,
“the daily lives of yellow vests are organized around discussions and experiments in
direct democracy, with weekly meetings, conferences and debates. Between tips on what
to read, discovery of the world of activism, and tutorials into banner making, many
emphasize that they have never learned as much as they have since they joined the
movement.”59
While their forms of activism have changed, their political goals have not. “The
vest is, above all, a state of mind,” wrote the same reporter. Some Gilets Jaunes are in
fact running for office now, but many are doing so on citizens tickets and are actively
building local instruments of direct democracy.60 For many who donned the vest, the
movement catalyzed a political awakening. Now, those living in peripheral France are
making daily lifestyle changes as a result. Local symptoms of challenging the political
party system include going to the market rather than the supermarket, creating a
communal childcare network, and boycotting globalized services such as Amazon.”61
Ultimately, the Gilets Jaunes were limited by some of the very qualities that made
them so unique, including their ideological vagueness, political diversity and resistance to
both political parties and labor unions. Consequently, the greatest strengths and longestlasting implications of the movement are a politicization of the daily lives of many of its
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participants who will not hesitate to mobilize in the future. While they have weakened on
a national level, they continue to show strength on a local level. After all, localized action
has always been their specialty.
What remains to be seen is the impact of the Gilets Jaunes on mainstream political
parties, who will have to shift their platforms in order to maintain – or regain –
legitimacy among a vital voting bloc.

Conclusion
The Gilets Jaunes movement is consequential because it signifies the extent to
which certain demographics have become disillusioned with electoral politics, no longer
viewing this system as a viable route toward achieving their political goals. Institutional
distrust coupled with the misalignment between political parties and the working class are
two key factors contributing to the mobilization of the Gilets Jaunes which, left
unresolved as they currently are, will continue to funnel individuals into extra
institutional, anti-system movements.
While the movement has weakened and lost many of its original particularities,
the evolution of the Gilets Jaunes carries significant implications for French democracy.
First of all, the Gilets Jaunes movement illustrates the undeniable linkages between
growing economic wealth gaps of industrialized democracies and the weakening
legitimacy of traditional political institutions. While disillusioned populations in other
countries have embraced the scapegoating and charismatic candidates of radical political
parties, the Gilets Jaunes’ distrust of political parties shielded them from the temptations
of parties such as the Rassemblement National, protecting their vision of political and
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economic accountability. Their reluctance to turn to political parties can also be
explained by the design of French political system itself: because political power is so
concentrated in the presidency, protestors know they need only focus on the president,
who can make the changes they want to see. This accelerates the obsolescence of the
traditional party system and empowers extra institutional courses of action that pressure
the presidency instead of institutional courses of action like running for office or forming
a political party.
The most vital takeaway is what this means for the future of French representative
democracy. The Gilets Jaunes demonstrate that anti-system politics and social
movements are a necessary phase to shuffle the political deck and to construct grassroots
institutions of change that will restore the rotting legitimacy of the political system. It is
likely that as the same structural factors, such as rising economic inequality, resistance to
political institutionalization, political misalignment and a sense of social abandonment,
appear in other countries, such as the U.S., similar mobilizations will emerge.
The philosopher Fredric Jameson wrote that it had become “easier to imagine the
end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism.” To succeed, the Gilets Jaunes
will need to do more than oppose, and create dysfunction within, the current system –
they must devise a concrete plan to build a France in line with their demands. This may
require entering political channels and coalition building with labor unions. It may, in
fact, require a Sixth Republic to disperse the power of the presidency to other
representative political institutions. It may require acceptance that creating a new system
sometimes requires working with the current structure. Whether the Gilets Jaunes are
able to enact political change beyond a localized scale will determine their capacity to
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create the broad-based change they envision. While unlikely, the temporary unification of
individuals from across the political spectrum, in opposition to the traditional party
system, is a legacy unto itself.
Although storefronts have been repaired and the metro now runs uninterrupted on
Saturdays, the movement’s legacy remains intact. Though less visible than the
movement’s iconic uniform, the mobilizing structures created last year are extensive and
are continually reinforced through expansive networks established among a previously
divided and powerless segment of the French people. Though the broader implications of
a politicized French periphery remain to be seen (and will be revealed based on the shifts
made by mainstream party platforms) the message has been communicated to Macron
and the French government with unmistakable clarity: tread carefully, for accountability
exists where it did not before.
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